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Abstract—Software complexity has increased over the years.
One common way to tackle this complexity during development
is to encapsulate features into a shared library. This allows
developers to reuse already implemented features instead of
reimplementing them over and over again. However, not all
features provided by a shared library are actually used by an
application. As a result, an application using shared libraries
loads unused code into memory, which an attacker can use to
perform code-reuse and similar types of attacks. The same holds
for applications written in a scripting language such as PHP or
Ruby: The interpreter typically offers much more functionality
than is actually required by the application and hence provides
a larger overall attack surface.
In this paper, we tackle this problem and propose a first
step towards automated application-specific software stacks. We
present a compiler extension capable of removing unneeded code
from shared libraries and—with the help of domain knowledge—
also capable of removing unused functionalities from an inter-
preter’s code base during the compilation process. Our evaluation
against a diverse set of real-world applications, among others
Nginx, Lighttpd, and the PHP interpreter, removes on average
71.3% of the code in musl-libc, a popular libc implementation.
The evaluation on web applications show that a tailored PHP
interpreter can mitigate entire vulnerability classes, as is the case
for OpenConf. We demonstrate the applicability of our debloating
approach by creating an application-specific software stack for a
Wordpress web application: we tailor the libc library to the Nginx
web server and PHP interpreter, whereas the PHP interpreter
is tailored to the Wordpress web application. In this real-world
scenario, the code of the libc is decreased by 65.1% in total,
thereby reducing the available code for code-reuse attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
To reduce complexity of software and provide low-level
features in a consistent manner, the concept of shared li-
braries was developed. This gives developers the possibility
to focus solely on the user-facing application rather than re-
implementing common functionality such as memory man-
agement or string processing functions over and over again.
However, since not all code of a given shared library is
used in a given program, the downside of this concept is
that unnecessary code is loaded into memory: a recent study
finds that only 5% of the libc, the standard library for the
C programming language, is used on average across 2,016
applications of the Ubuntu Desktop environment [31].
From an attacker’s perspective, the typical way to exploit
an existing vulnerability is to reuse existing code (e. g.,
ret2libc [38] or return-oriented programming [34] (ROP)) to
execute shellcode and bypass existing mitigation systems such
as W⊕R and address space layout randomization (ASLR).
Since shared libraries offer a plethora of (mostly) unused code,
the attacker has a large variety of existing functions or code
parts to choose from.
The same holds for applications written in interpreted
languages, such as PHP, Python, or Ruby: the interpreter is a
complex piece of software and offers more functionality than
the application actually requires [30]. Hence, an attacker that
is able to inject her own script code into the application can
leverage these provided but unused methods to execute her
exploit.
One way to remove the unused code of a shared library is
to statically link it against the target application. This allows
the linker to remove the unnecessary code and thus reduce the
availability of code snippets an attacker can choose from for
a code-reuse attack. However, this increases the complexity
in managing software updates: since each application has to
be compiled statically linked with all used libraries, each has
to be updated when a vulnerability is found in the code of
any used library. To tackle this problem, Quach et al. [31]
presented the concept of piece-wise compilation and loading.
It allows to compile an application and shared libraries with
additional metadata to have a customized loader only load the
needed code into memory. Unfortunately, the concept of this
approach only works with shared libraries and does not apply
to applications written in interpreted languages.
In this paper, we present a first step towards automatic
application-specific software stacks. Our goal is to customize
the software stack for a given application (e. g., a web ap-
plication or server application) such that only the actually
required library code and underlying execution environment
is contained within the software stack, hence debloating the
software stack. To achieve this goal, we introduce a compiler
extension capable of removing unused code from shared
libraries, written in C. With information about which exported
functions the target application uses, the compiler pass can
omit functions at compile time from the shared library that
are not used by the application or library itself. As a result,
a shared library specifically tailored to the target application
is created. To enhance usability, our approach is able to
create shared libraries that are tailored to more than one
application (e. g., a script interpreter and a web server). In
contrast to a statically linked library, tailoring to a group of
applications provides the same flexibility as a dynamically
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shared library given that only the shared library has to be re-
compiled if a vulnerability in its code was discovered. When
deployed with other existing defenses, such as Control-Flow
Integrity (CFI) [11], an application-specific software stack
further restricts the wiggle room an attacker can exploit to
perform a successful attack.
Moreover, we show that—with the help of domain
knowledge—this approach is also capable of removing un-
used functionalities in script interpreters when targeting an
application written in an interpreted language (such as PHP or
Ruby). Consider for example a Wordpress installation. With
our approach, a PHP interpreter can be tailored to the concrete
Wordpress web application. Since all unused functionalities
are removed from the interpreter, an attacker that is able
to inject script code (e. g., by uploading a script file) is
no longer able to leverage them for their attack. Moreover,
instead of removing unused functionalities in the interpreter,
our approach allows to replace them with booby traps [16],
i. e., dormant code that when executed triggers an alarm. This
way, an ongoing attack can be detected when a functionality
that was removed is executed. Note that the Wordpress-specific
PHP interpreter and the web server can be compiled with our
debloating approach for libraries, leading to an application-
specific software stack. Regarding the recent trend to separate
services into container (such as Docker [1]) to provide a better
security in case of a vulnerability, this makes tailoring shared
libraries to specific server applications real-world deployable.
An application-specific script interpreter also allows to
reduce the attack surface significantly in environments in
which untrusted scripts are executed (such as Google App
Engine [4]). Normally, unwanted functionalities are disabled
in configuration files. However, since the code that provides
these functionalities is still available in the script interpreter, an
attacker might be able to bypass the restrictions and escape
the interpreter’s internal sandbox [28]. When compiling the
script interpreter in an application-specific way, the code for
the unneeded functionalities are completely removed, which
prevents an attacker from using them entirely.
We evaluated our prototype compiler pass for LLVM by
tailoring two libc implementations (musl-libc and uClibc) to a
diverse set of applications. The results show that on average
the code for the musl-libc tailored to an application is reduced
by 71.3%. A previous study on libc utilization [31] concluded
that only 5% of code on average is used in the library.
However, their evaluation set consists of mostly small applica-
tions, which explains the significant difference in comparison
to our results. Additionally, we show that by using domain
knowledge, our prototype is able to mitigate possible attacks
on web applications: starting from seven security-critical PHP
functions that might be used for remote command execution
(according to the RIPS code analyzer [7]) in the interpreter, a
PHP interpreter tailored to OpenConf or FluxBB only contains
one sensitive PHP function. This significantly raises the bar
for an attacker able to execute own PHP code since using a
removed PHP functionality triggers a booby trap and hence
raises an alarm. In fact, in case of OpenConf, our approach
removes the possibility to execute shell commands from the
interpreter in most system configurations due to the nature of
the remaining sensitive PHP function. Additionally, we show
the real-world applicability of our approach by creating a
Docker container consisting of an application-specific software
stack for a Wordpress installation. Our evaluation shows that
the code of the libc used by the web server and PHP interpreter
in this container is reduced by 65.1% in total, hence demon-
strating that our debloating approach removes a signification
fraction of unused code.
Contributions. In summary, we provide the following contri-
butions in this paper:
• We present the design and implementation of an LLVM
compiler pass capable of removing unused code from
shared libraries and script interpreters written in C that
effectively reduces the available code snippets for reuse
attacks by debloating the software stack used by a given
application.
• Our evaluation shows that on average 71.3% of the code
in the musl-libc is removed when tailoring it to a target
application. Moreover, when applying our approach to the
PHP interpreter by targeting specific web applications, it
is capable of eliminating entire vulnerability classes, such
as command execution.
To foster research on this topic, we release the prototype
implementation of our LLVM compiler pass as open-source
software under https://github.com/RUB-SysSec/ASSS.
II. BACKGROUND
Shared libraries offer developers a way to reuse already
implemented functionalities in their program. These func-
tionalities can either be code in the form of functions or
data (e. g., global variables). For example, libc provides the
developer with a variety of low-level functionalities (e. g.,
memory allocation and string processing). During compilation,
there are two ways to couple the external functionalities with
the own application: static linking and dynamic linking. In
case of static linking, the external functionalities are resolved
and plainly copied into the application during compilation.
This means that no shared library is needed to execute the
application since all library-provided functionalities are part
of the program itself and hence available in memory. In case
of dynamic linking, the external functionalities are replaced
with a symbol which is resolved during the execution of
the program. Hence, the shared libraries that provide the
functionalities have to be present in memory to execute the
application.
In practice, dynamic linking is used in most deployment
scenarios. This allows the system to use the same shared
library for multiple applications. Furthermore, having only
one copy of the shared library improves usability during
software patching: if a vulnerability is found in a function
offered by a shared library, the user only needs to update the
corresponding shared library. Since all dependent applications
use this shared library, the vulnerability is fixed for all of
them. In case of static linking, all applications using this
functionality have to be updated to fix the vulnerability. As
explained earlier, the main downside of using dynamic linking
is the fact that this approach increases the amount of unused
code that is mapped into the memory of the application.
Therefore, sensible operations in functionalities not used by
the application itself are also present in memory.
III. HIGH-LEVEL OVERVIEW
The idea behind application-specific software stacks is
based on the observation that applications do not use every
functionality provided by their underlying software stack (e. g.,
interpreters or libraries). Therefore, it is safe to remove code of
these unused functionalities to debloat the application without
affecting it. Furthermore, by removing code snippets or whole
functions that can potentially be used by an attacker in code-
reuse attacks narrows down the options an attacker has. This
also holds for scripting languages, for example, in a web
application context: the script interpreter offers more function-
ality than the web application uses. Stripping the interpreter
from these functionalities debloats the interpreter, but does
not interfere with the given web application. Moreover, in
cases an attacker is able to insert her own script code (e. g.,
by uploading a script file to a web server), she is limited in
the interpreter functionalities she can use. Figure 1 shows the
difference between a normal software stack and an application-
specific one graphically.
We define two layers for a software stack: the application
layer and the support layer. The application itself resides
on the application layer. This can either be a native code
application or an application written in an interpreted lan-
guage (e. g., web application). In a web application context,
the application layer also includes the web framework the
application uses. The libraries and script interpreter are located
on the support layer. This layer provides functionalities that are
used by the application. However, it also contains additional
code and functionalities that are not used by the application.
Underneath the support layer resides the operating system
(OS). Functionalities provided by the OS are usually accessed
via the support layer through low-level libraries such as the
libc.
Our goal is to debloat the software stack by removing
unneeded code from the support layer. This is done by
analyzing the application and retrieving control transfers from
the application layer into the support layer. This information
is then used to recompile the support layer without the unused
code. The result is a software stack tailored to the application.
However, this approach is not limited to tailoring the support
layer to only one application, thus increasing its usability.
Consider for example a Wordpress installation. The libraries
used by the web server and PHP interpreter can be specifically
tailored to support both. Moreover, the PHP interpreter can be
customized to only contain functionalities used by Wordpress.
Hence, the debloating is achieved throughout the whole soft-
ware stack by preserving the usability of shared libraries.
In the case of native code applications, the same code
reduction can be achieved by using static linking during the
compilation and linking process. As a result, the functionalities
provided by the libraries and used by the application are
directly inserted into the code of the program. This moves
part of the support layer directly into the application layer.
However, this also means that the advantages of sharing
libraries between multiple applications are also lost. As a
result, as soon as a vulnerability is discovered in a library
functionality, all applications using this library have to be
updated. Application-specific software stacks, on the other
hand, still provide the advantages of shared libraries. It is
possible to group different applications to use one shared
library tailored to them (as in our example a web server and
script interpreter). Hence, our approach offers a middle ground
between code reduction and usability.
IV. APPROACH
In this section, we describe our approach for application-
specific software stacks. We start by describing the basic
method of our LLVM pass and refining it step-by-step through-
out this section until each challenge encountered is tackled.
The final goal in this paper is to create a Wordpress installation
with a tailored PHP interpreter and a libc implementation
application-specific to the interpreter and web server. Hence,
the described method focuses only on tailoring the libraries
to a target application first. Afterwards, domain knowledge is
used to enhance our approach to also support specific script
interpreters, more specifically, the PHP and Ruby interpreter.
The complete algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1 in the
Appendix.
A. Libraries
The control-flow transfer from the application layer into
the support layer can be performed in multiple ways. In
the easiest form, it is a direct call of a function. However,
more complicated constructs such as indirect calls via function
pointers are also possible. An analysis tailoring libraries to
a specific application at compile time must not miss any of
these, since one missing functionality leads to an uncompilable
library in the best case, and a broken application in the worst.
Next, we describe a method for LLVM capable of handling
all these cases.
a) Base Method: We start with a whitelist of functions,
which initially contains all exported functions of the library
used by the target application. The exported functions can
be obtained by reading the metadata of the target application
(e. g., with the help of the binutils tool readelf). Consider
the example shown in Figure 2. The target application uses the
function area_square of the library. During compilation,
each currently processed function is checked if it resides in
the whitelist. If the function area_square is processed,
all direct control-flow transfers are also explored. Each new
function that is reachable by the direct control-flow transfer is
added to the whitelist and further explored. In this example,
the function area_rectangle is added to the whitelist.
Application
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Fig. 1: Schematic overview of the difference of the code footprint between a traditional software stack and an application-
specific one showing the average code reduction of around 70%. On the left it is shown for a native code application, on the
right for an interpreted application such as a web application. Even though the interpreter is part of the support layer, it also
does not use the complete code provided by the shared libraries.
libarea.so
area_ellipsearea_circle
area_square area_rectangle
... 
call area_rectangle 
... 
... 
call area_ellipse 
... 
... 
 
... 
Whitelist
area_square
Fig. 2: Example of the basic idea of the analysis. A target
application uses the function area_square. Hence, the
function area_rectangle is also added to the whitelist.
This phase of searching for new reachable functions is called
function exploration. Since this phase uses a depth-first search
(DFS) approach, it is guaranteed to visit all functions that are
reachable by an initial given function. Hence, all functions in
the whitelist after the analysis is finished are necessary for the
application to work. All other functions can be safely removed.
In the given example, area_circle and area_ellipse
are dismissed.
b) Indirect Control-Flow Transfers: Unfortunately, the
compiler cannot always determine the target of a control-
flow transfer. Often control-flow transfers are handled with
the help of function pointers, i. e., through indirect call in-
structions. Therefore, we have to consider them during our
analysis. Hence, we have to extend our approach to work
with instructions handling function pointers. We found that the
following LLVM intermediate representation (IR) instructions
are capable of handling function pointers:
• store: storing data in a variable.
• return: returning data at the end of a function.
• select: chooses between two distinct values depending
on a boolean condition.
• phi: merging multiple variables into a single variable for
Single Static Assignment (SSA) form [17].
Since all these instructions can work with a function pointer,
our analysis has to be able to process them. Therefore, we
extend the function exploration phase to extract the data
handled by these instructions to find all indirect control-
flow transfers. If the extracted data is a function pointer, we
continue the exploration at the pointer target.
This refined method handles all possible function pointers
that are set inside the used code. However, since the semantics
of the code are not considered, this analysis can overestimate
the actually used functions. Consider for example a select
instruction that chooses between two function pointers. When
the boolean condition evaluates always to true, then only
one function is ever reached by this code construct. Yet, our
analysis considers both functions as reachable and thus overes-
timates the actually used functions. Note that this conservative
overestimation guarantees us to not break the application.
c) Global Variables: Although function pointers set di-
rectly in the code are already handled by our analysis, function
pointers can also reside in global variables. Consider the code
snippet from musl-libc shown in Figure 3a. The function
__stdout_write is stored as function pointer in the global
variable stdout. This variable is a FILE struct used for
I/O operations. Figure 3b shows the function fwrite that
uses a pointer to a FILE struct to invoke the write function
stored there. Since the current form of our algorithm is not
able to find the __stdout_write function pointer in the
global variable, a valid call to fwrite with the global variable
stdout as argument would break the application.
To handle global variables, we add a global exploration
phase to our analysis. In this phase, all global variables are
processed and checked for function pointers. If they contain
a function pointer, the target is added to the whitelist as well.
The global exploration phase is executed before the function
exploration phase to guarantee that the newly whitelisted
functions are also explored. A discussion about limitations of
our function pointer analysis is given in Section VII.
B. Script Interpreters
Often applications written in scripting languages like PHP,
Ruby, or Python are not translated into native code, but
interpreted by the corresponding script interpreter. As a result,
the interpreter itself is a part of the support layer for these
static FILE f = {
.write = __stdout_write,
//...
};
FILE *const stdout = &f;
(a) Definition of a function pointer in a global variable from
src/stdio/stdout.c.
size_t __fwritex(const unsigned char
*restrict s, size_t l, FILE *restrict
f)
{
//...
size_t n = f->write(f, s, i);
//...
}
size_t fwrite(const void *restrict src,
size_t size, size_t nmemb, FILE
*restrict f)
{
//...
k = __fwritex(src, l, f);
//...
}
(b) Possible usage of a function pointer from
src/stdio/fwrite.c.
Fig. 3: Code snippets from musl-libc that show the usage of
function pointers in global variables.
applications. However, in contrast to the method described in
Section IV-A for native code libraries, the analysis cannot just
remove code from the interpreter since it cannot distinguish
which code belongs to a certain interpreter functionality.
Hence, to build an application-specific interpreter, our analysis
has to leverage domain knowledge about the internals of the
target interpreter. More specifically, the analysis has to know
the mapping of script functions to native code functions. To
achieve our goal of running a Wordpress installation with
an application-specific interpreter, we modify our analysis to
work with the PHP interpreter in the following. To show that
our approach is not limited to PHP, we further extend our
algorithm to work with the Ruby interpreter.
a) PHP: PHP stores information for each registered PHP
function in global function entries, which are basically a
map of structs [8]. The structs contain, among others, the
pointer to the native code function and the name of the
PHP function. During execution, they are used to handle
the transition from PHP to native code. The interpreter uses
these function entries to look up the native code function that
is eventually executed to perform the application’s desired
functionality. Hence, modifying these function entries during
the compilation of the PHP interpreter to remove the code
from it is the best way to keep our approach as generic as
possible. Since the function entries are part of the architecture
of PHP, they are less likely to change between different PHP
void Init_IO(void)
{
//...
rb_define_global_function("syscall",
rb_f_syscall,
-1);
rb_define_global_function("open",
rb_f_open,
-1);
rb_define_global_function("printf",
rb_f_printf,
-1);
//...
}
Fig. 4: Ruby function registration example from io.c.
versions and hence our approach should be compatible with
upcoming PHP releases.
To enable our analysis to remove PHP functionalities from
the interpreter at compile time, we introduce a whitelist of
PHP functions and modify the global exploration phase. The
modification extracts the PHP function names from the PHP
global function entries and checks if they are on the PHP
whitelist. If they are, the corresponding native function is
stored for processing during the function exploration phase.
As a result, the native code corresponding to the functionality
only remains in the interpreter when it is on the PHP whitelist.
PHP supports the paradigm of object-oriented programming,
i. e., functions can be associated to classes. An example of
a class and its member function directly provided by the
PHP interpreter is the Directory class and its function
read [3]. However, the PHP function name does not contain
any information about the associated class. Hence, if multiple
classes register a PHP function with the same name, our
analysis is not able to distinguish between them. Consider
an example where classes A and B both register a function
with the name read. If the application only uses A::read,
our analysis will still whitelist the read function of both
classes. This loss in precision results in the PHP interpreter
still containing functionality that is not needed, however, it
guarantees to not break the application.
b) Ruby: In contrast to PHP, Ruby does not register
its functions through global function tables. Instead, Ruby
functions are added by calling internal register functions at
runtime. Figure 4 shows how various I/O functions are regis-
tered in the Ruby source code. The arguments to the internal
register function contain the name of the Ruby function and
a pointer to its native code pendant. A list of all internal
register functions can be found in Listing 1. To remove the
functionality provided by Ruby functions, we aim to remove
these registering function calls from the code. Again, our
approach tries to focus on the architecture of the interpreter
since this is less likely to change between versions and hence
our approach should be compatible with upcoming Ruby
releases.
Listing 1: A list of Ruby’s internal registration functions.
1 rb_define_protected_method
2 rb_define_private_method
3 rb_define_singleton_method
4 rb_define_method
5 rb_define_method_id
6 rb_define_module_function
7 rb_define_global_function
8 rb_define_alloc_func
9 rb_define_virtual_variable
10 rb_define_hooked_variable
To enable our analysis to remove Ruby functionalities from
the interpreter at compile time, we added a whitelist for
Ruby functions and modified the function exploration phase.
Basically, the function exploration phase now checks if a
call instruction calls an internal register function to register
a Ruby functionality. If it does and the Ruby function name
of the registration is whitelisted, the corresponding native code
function is further explored. Otherwise, the corresponding call
instruction is deleted from the code. As a result, only the
code corresponding to whitelisted Ruby functions is part of
the compiled Ruby interpreter and since the call instruction is
removed, the Ruby interpreter does not register the function-
ality at runtime and preserves its integrity.
This method works with Ruby functions registered directly
in the code. However, dynamically registered Ruby functions
are not detected. But since we did not encounter any dynami-
cally registered Ruby functions in the core functionalities, we
did not pursue it further.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
Our prototype implementation resides inside the compiler
itself since it has to be able to modify the code and data struc-
tures directly (e. g., for the PHP interpreter). Hence, to build a
tailored software stack for a given software, the whole support
layer has to be re-compiled using our compiler pass. The
support layer consists of the libraries (and script interpreter) of
the target application, and all libraries used by the libraries.
Eventually, an application-specific software stack is created
for the given software. For native code applications, the used
exported functions have to be extracted as initial information
for the compiler pass (e. g., with the help of the binutils
tool readelf). For applications using script languages, the
analysis to get all used interpreter functionalities has to be
done by external tools like Parse [6] for PHP.
We built the prototype of our approach as compiler pass for
LLVM 5.0.1. In total, our implementation consists of around
1,000 lines of C++ and 100 lines of Python code. To prevent
possible dependency issues, each created module by LLVM is
merged into one. This gives our compiler pass a global view of
all existing code and data. Since our pass works on the LLVM
IR, it is completely architecture and platform independent.
Hence, each architecture that is supported by LLVM is also
supported by our approach (e. g., ARM or MIPS).
sigsetjmp:
__sigsetjmp:
;...
.hidden __sigsetjmp_tail
jmp __sigsetjmp_tail
;...
Fig. 5: Assembler instructions initiating a control-flow transfer
found in src/signal/x86_64/sigsetjmp.s
In order to integrate it into the build process of an applica-
tion as seamlessly as possible, we created a compiler wrapper
script. This script is used as compiler for the application and
handles all steps needed to perform our analysis.
A. Manual Configuration
Although our approach aims to automate the process in
creating an application-specific software stack, a user might
want to preserve certain functionality in the libraries. This
can have various reasons, e. g., using the same library by
multiple applications. Hence, the user is able to modify the
configuration file for the library and add additional function
names to the whitelist. Furthermore, a library could need an
additional whitelisted function which is not referenced directly
from the application. This is the case for C entry functions
(e. g., _start) which are directly called by the loader during
load time.
Since LLVM does not lift assembly instructions into its IR,
control-flow transfers to functions done in assembly are not
detected by our analysis. Figure 5 shows an example encoun-
tered while compiling musl-libc for the target application. The
control-flow transfer to function __sigsetjmp_tail is not
detected by our analysis. We encountered five such cases in
which assembly instructions in the code call a function not
referenced in the rest of the code base (three in musl-libc
and two in uClibc). Since we did not encounter any cases
outside of the libc, we believe such cases more common in
libraries providing low-level functionalities such as memory
management and hence an exception.
Another case for manual configuration are functions that
are resolved dynamically via loader functionalities such as
dlsym. Since these functions do not have a reference in the
code (either a direct reference or an indirect via a function
pointer), our current prototype is not able to detect them.
However, since we only encountered one case of dynamically
resolved functions during our evaluation (__dls3 in musl-
libc), we believe this feature to be rarely used in practice.
Furthermore, this function was not resolved by loader func-
tionalities, but by a self-implemented version of dlsym inside
the musl-libc. This shows further how difficult it is to fully
automate the process of creating an application-specific soft-
ware stack and the reason for allowing manual configuration.
A detailed discussion on how to address these cases in an
automated way is given in Section VII.
B. Booby Trapping Script Interpreters
Most scripting languages offer ways to list all registered
functions. An attacker able to execute script commands is
therefore able to use this functionality as information leak
to circumvent removed functionality. For example, the PHP
function get_defined_functions returns all functions
registered to the interpreter. To thwart these attempts, our
approach is not only able to remove functionality from the
script interpreter, but to replace its native code implementation
with a booby trap [16]. A booby trap contains code that when
executed warns from an attack. Since this code lies dormant in
memory and is never executed by the benign application, an
execution of this code detects an altered control flow and hence
an ongoing attack. When the native code implementation of a
script function is replaced by this code, an attacker executing
interpreter functionality that is not used by the application
otherwise is detected. Furthermore, this removes any leak
regarding the information about functions registered to the
interpreter. If the attacker does not have access to the source
code of the application (e. g., a proprietary application), this
removes the possibility to circumvent booby traps.
VI. EVALUATION
As a target for our applications, we use Linux on the
Intel x86-64 architecture because of its popularity as a server
system. In this section, we first evaluate the effect of an
application-specific software stack on the used shared libraries,
afterwards a PHP interpreter tailored to specific web applica-
tions is measured. Subsequently, we study the code reduction
of our approach on our running example: an application-
specific software stack for a Wordpress installation. Finally,
we perform a security evaluation of our approach on the basis
of several CVEs and discuss the performance overhead.
A. Libraries
To evaluate the effect of our approach on native code appli-
cations, we compile different libc versions as an application-
specific software stack. Unfortunately, the most common im-
plementation glibc is written in GNU C, an extension of the C
programming language which is not supported by LLVM [27].
Therefore, we resort to two other popular libc implementa-
tions: musl-libc (1.1.18) and uClibc (0.9.34). The musl-libc
focuses on speed, feature-completeness, and simplicity [5]. It
is used, for instance, by the Alpine Linux distribution, which
is the distribution used for official Docker containers [15].
The uClibc implementation targets microcontrollers and there-
fore focuses mainly on size [10] (e. g., it is used by the
buildroot project [2]). We compile both libc implementations
without any changes by our transformation to have a complete
shared library to compare against as an upper boundary. As
a lower boundary, we compile both implementations using
our approach with a minimal configuration which contains the
least amount of functions necessary in the initial whitelist to
compile the library (5 functions for musl-libc and 12 functions
for uClibc).
To show the effect of an application-specific shared library,
we compile the libc implementation for different applications:
Micro-Lisp, Nginx (1.13.8), Lighttpd (1.4.48), Busybox (1.28),
PHP (7.3.0-dev) for different web applications, and Miniruby
(2.6.0-dev). To have a small basic PHP interpreter that supports
all base features of our used web applications, we enabled
support for Mysqli and zlib and disabled support for XML,
iconv, PEAR, and DOM. Additionally, the PHP interpreter is
also compiled in a minimal configuration (the least amount of
functions necessary to run it) and in a complete configuration
to better show the impact of an application-specific library.
The Ruby interpreter has the option to build a smaller version
of itself called Miniruby. This interpreter only contains the
core functionalities (YARV instruction set [33]) of the Ruby
interpreter. Since the difference between a complete Miniruby
interpreter and a minimal Miniruby are smaller, it is more
suited to show the impact of our approach than the full-
fledged Ruby interpreter. For Busybox, we had to disable the
coreutil functionalities: date, echo, ls, mknod, mktemp,
nl, stat, sync, test and usleep. We were not able to
compile uClibc with LLVM when these features were activated
because of the dependency on buildroot. Hence, we had to
modify the toolchain for uClibc to work without buildroot.
a) Code Reduction: Table I depicts the results of our
measurements. As evident from the table, the complete musl-
libc has 2,603 functions, whereas a minimal configuration
only needs 358 functions (13.8%) to be compilable. These
configurations provide an upper and lower boundary of the
code reduction that is possible for a target application. When
tailoring the musl-libc to a specific application, Micro-lisp
needs the fewest functions from the library with 14.1% remain-
ing. In fact, this configuration needs only eight functions more
than the minimal configuration which is necessary to compile
the library. A complete PHP interpreter needs the most with
39.0%. On average, 30.3% of the functions remain in the musl-
libc when tailored to an application. Since uClibc focuses on
being as small as possible to work on microcontrollers, it
does not have all features that the libc provides. Therefore,
only Busybox and Micro-Lisp of our evaluation set work
with this library. The complete library has 891 functions,
whereas the minimal configuration only has 164 (18.4%). A
uClibc tailored to Micro-lisp has 168, which are 18.9% of
all functions and only four functions more than the minimal
configuration possible. The Busybox configuration has 43.6%
functions remaining after its compilation. This shows that even
a library focusing on being as small as possible can be further
reduced by our approach. The code size confirms that the
libraries did not only lose small wrapper-like functions, but
that the code is reduced in a proportional way to the number
of functions present.
Removing PHP functionalities from the interpreter also
influences the code required in the underlying libc. A complete
PHP interpreter has 39.0% of the functions available in the
musl-libc remaining, whereas a minimal PHP interpreter only
needs 29.5% of the functions in the library. A PHP interpreter
tailored to the Wordpress web application, the largest web
TABLE I: Results of the remaining code for musl-libc and uClibc. On top for each library, the table shows the number of
functions and code size for the complete and minimal library. The minimal library shows the remaining code for a configuration
which contains the minimal number of functions to compile the library. Following the same metrics for the library tailored to
a specific application.
Application #Funcs % Code Size % Application # Funcs % Code Size %
musl-libc (complete) 2,603 1,007 kB uClibc (complete) 891 450 kB
musl-libc (minimal) 358 13.8 116 kB 11.5 uClibc (minimal) 164 18.4 108 kB 23.9
Micro-lisp 366 14.1 118 kB 11.7 Micro-lisp 168 18.9 115 kB 25.5
Busybox 893 34.3 345 kB 34.2 Busybox 388 43.6 329 kB 73.2
Nginx 762 29.3 276 kB 27.4
Lighttpd 745 28.6 260 kB 25.9
PHP (Complete) 1,014 39.0 390 kB 38.8
PHP (FluxBB) 817 31.4 296 kB 29.4
PHP (OpenConf) 839 32.2 326 kB 32.3
PHP (Wordpress) 874 33.6 336 kB 33.4
PHP (Minimal) 768 29.5 280 kB 27.8
Miniruby (Complete) 907 34.8 325 kB 32.3
Miniruby (Minimal) 684 26.3 221 kB 21.9
application of our evaluation set, needs only 33.6% of the
functions of the musl-libc. On average, a PHP interpreter tai-
lored to a web application needs only 32.4% of the functions.
This shows that for software debloating it is imperative to not
only focus on the shared libraries itself, but to take into account
the actual application running when an interpreted language is
used.
b) Code-Reuse Attacks: A modern way for an attacker
to exploit a vulnerability in an application is to reuse existing
code. One way for an attacker is to transfer the control flow
to an existing function in a library with crafted arguments
and therefore execute the behavior the attacker desires (e. g.,
ret2libc attack [38]). However, since the number of existing
functions in the library is significantly reduced, an attacker
may not be able to find a function that executes the behavior
she needs. For example, in all configurations listed in Table I,
except for Busybox for uClibc, the function system which
is usually used to execute shell commands in an exploit is
removed from the code.
Another way to reuse existing code for an attack is called
return-oriented programming (ROP) [34]. For this exploiting
technique, small code snippets called gadgets are combined
by the attacker to build the shellcode. Since an attacker needs
a variety of different ROP gadgets to obtain the shellcode she
needs, we measured the reduction of gadgets in the library
with the tool ROPgadget [32] in version 5.6. While a tailored
software stack alone does not prevent code-reuse attacks, this
metric gives an estimate on the limitation an application-
specific software stack imposes on ROP attacks. Besides
measuring the number of unique ROP gadgets remaining,
we also measured security-sensitive gadgets such as jump-
oriented programming (JOP) [12], call-oriented programming
(COP) [13], call-preceding gadgets (CP) [13], and syscall
gadgets [34].
A minimal configuration of musl-libc and uClibc has only
16.3% and 28.5% of the unique ROP gadgets the complete
library has. A tailored musl-libc has in the worst case 41.4%
of unique ROP gadgets remaining for the complete PHP
interpreter and in the best case 16.3% for Micro-lisp. For a
tailored uClibc, 28.3% of the unique ROP gadgets remain for
Micro-lisp and 63.9% for Busybox. Since uClibc is already
optimized in regard to code size, the gadget reduction was to
be expected less than the one for musl-libc. A full overview
of all remaining gadgets is given in Table II.
Overall, our evaluation shows that an application-specific
library loses most of its code. The code size reduces propor-
tionally to the number of functions removed. Furthermore, the
number of unique ROP gadgets is reduced significantly, which
narrows down the choices an attacker has when exploiting
a vulnerability. While an application-specific software stack
alone does not prevent code-reuse attacks, the combination of
a tailored software stack with other defenses (e. g., CFI) might
restrict an attacker sufficiently to prevent exploitation.
B. Web Applications
To show the applicability of an application-specific software
stack for applications using a script interpreter, we measure
the impact of our approach on web applications, namely
FluxBB (version 1.5.10, 21,295 LOC), OpenConf (version
6.80, 21,232 LOC), and Wordpress (version 4.9.1, 183,820
LOC). We focus on web applications for PHP and use the same
interpreter as compiled for the evaluation in Section VI-A. To
give a realistic overview, we have chosen web applications of
different categories and sizes. To generate the initial whitelist
of PHP functions as described in Section IV-B0a, we use the
static analysis tool Parse [6]. Unfortunately, Parse does not
support the paradigm of object-oriented programming, which
leads to the necessity to add two additional functions to the
initial whitelist for FluxBB (dir and read) and one for
Wordpress (mysqli_connect).
Although modern web applications often provide a way to
install additional plugins, we only evaluate our approach on
the basic web applications to give a base line of removable
functionalities. If someone wants to use specific plugins, these
plugins only have to be included into the extraction of PHP
TABLE II: Results of our gadget evaluation for musl-libc and uClibc. On top for each library, the table shows the number of
unique ROP gadgets for the complete and minimal library. The minimal library shows the remaining gadgets for a configuration
which contains the minimal number of functions to compile the library. Following the same metrics for the library tailored to
a specific application.
Application # unique % #JOP % #COP % #CP % syscall %
musl-libc (complete) 9,692 332 324 581 157
musl-libc (minimal) 1,578 16.3 40 12.1 106 32.7 108 18.6 81 51.6
Micro-lisp 1,581 16.3 36 10.8 113 34.9 110 18.9 81 51.6
Busybox 3,203 33.1 152 45.8 204 62.7 252 43.4 103 65.6
Nginx 3,196 33.0 105 31.6 166 51.2 209 36.0 106 67.5
Lighttpd 2,694 27.8 97 29.2 163 50.3 224 38.6 101 64.3
PHP (Complete) 4,012 41.4 130 39.2 235 72.5 281 48.4 106 67.5
PHP (FluxBB) 2,950 30.4 99 29.8 210 64.8 222 38.2 100 63.7
PHP (OpenConf) 3,387 35.0 101 30.4 201 62.0 226 38.9 97 61.8
PHP (Wordpress) 3,518 36.3 133 40.1 184 56.8 223 38.4 97 61.8
PHP (Minimal) 2,794 28.8 85 25.6 187 57.7 195 33.6 96 61.2
Miniruby (Complete) 3,533 36.5 97 29.2 181 55.9 237 40.8 112 71.3
Miniruby (Minimal) 2,578 26.6 59 17.8 176 54.3 181 31.2 104 66.2
uClibc (complete) 6,101 663 285 546 733
uClibc (minimal) 1,736 28.5 87 13.1 75 26.3 142 26.0 150 20.5
Micro-lisp 1,724 28.3 82 12.4 77 27.0 146 26.7 150 20.5
Busybox 3,896 63.9 315 47.5 129 45.3 312 57.1 325 44.3
TABLE III: Results for PHP. The categories show the number of sensitive functions remaining in the PHP interpreter for each
configuration. The special configurations complete and minimal give the numbers of sensitive functions for an unmodified PHP
interpreter and a PHP interpreter containing the least number of functions to be executable.
Base Interpreter Application-Specific Interpreter
Complete Minimal FluxBB OpenConf Wordpress
Code Execution 5 0 3 2 3
Command Execution 7 0 1 1 4
functions for the initial whitelist to work with the resulting
customized interpreter.
To evaluate the quality of the removed code, we measure
the number of remaining sensitive functions in the script
interpreter. We use the categories provided by the open source
version of RIPS, a static PHP security scanner [9]. Since the
goal of an application-specific script interpreter is to reduce
the impact of an attacker executing arbitrary PHP code (e. g.,
by uploading an attacker controlled script file), we focus on
the categories Code Execution and Command Execution. Code
Execution contains all functions that allow an attacker to
execute arbitrary PHP functionality and Command Execution
contains all functions that allow an attacker to execute shell
commands on the host. Table III shows the full results, in the
following we provide a high-level overview.
The base interpreter without any functions removed has
five PHP functions in the Code Execution category (assert,
create_function, preg_filter, preg_replace,
and preg_replace_callback). In contrast, a minimal
configuration of the interpreter (least amount of PHP functions
necessary to run the interpreter itself) does not have any
such function. This shows that it is possible to remove this
functionality completely from the interpreter as long as the
target web application does not use one of the sensitive
functions. Unfortunately, all projects use some Code Execution
functionality and hence our approach is not able to remove it
completely from the script interpreter with FluxBB using three
different PHP functions, OpenConf two, and Wordpress three.
PHP functions that provide the ability to execute arbitrary
shell commands on the host system are in the category Com-
mand Execution. A complete PHP interpreter provides seven
such functions (exec, passthru, popen, proc_open,
shell_exec, system, and mail) and a minimal config-
uration none. Unfortunately, each of the web applications of
our evaluation set again uses at least one sensitive function
from the category. For a FluxBB installation, the only PHP
function allowing arbitrary shell command execution remain-
ing is exec. However, since exec is only used to display the
system’s uptime in the administration control panel, removing
it from the code would allow to remove the ability to execute
shell commands completely from the script interpreter. Hence,
an attacker that is able to upload her own script file to a
web server is no longer able to execute shell commands.
An OpenConf configuration has also only one PHP function
remaining in the Command Execution category, the function
mail. However, there are multiple limiting factors to consider
before an attacker is able to execute shell commands with the
help of mail which we discuss in Section VI-D in detail.
Hence, a tailored script interpreter for OpenConf removes the
attack vector of Command Execution in most cases completely.
A configuration for Wordpress has still four PHP functions
that allow shell command execution. Here, the functionality
still remains in the script interpreter and a malicious usage is
only mitigated by the insertion of booby traps as explained in
Section V-B. An attacker not knowing about the tailored PHP
interpreter that gains arbitrary PHP function execution could
trigger a booby trap by executing a removed functionality.
In summary, an application-specific script interpreter re-
duces the available options for executing code or shell com-
mands. Furthermore, it is also able to remove certain function-
alities altogether and leave the attacker with no possibility to
perform such an attack. In cases where the functionality still
remains in the interpreter, it mitigates its malicious effects by
inserting booby traps (which are especially effective in case
of proprietary web applications) that can be triggered by an
attacker using a removed functionality.
C. Use Case: Wordpress Container
To evaluate the debloating effect for a real-world scenario,
we created a Docker container for our running example,
an application-specific Wordpress installation. This container
comprises of a PHP interpreter tailored to Wordpress, as well
as a musl-libc tailored to the Nginx web server and PHP
interpreter. Since the web server has to interact with the
interpreter directly, PHP is additionally compiled with the
FastCGI Process Manager (FPM). This scenario comprises
a setting for which our approach was designed. One shared
library tailored to multiple applications to keep the usability
benefits of dynamic linking and a script interpreter customized
for a web application.
The code reduction for the script interpreter is as discussed
in Section VI-B. However, the reduction in the library is
different since it is now tailored to two applications. The code
of the musl-libc is reduced to 351 kB (34.9% of its original
size). To put things in perspective, the musl-libc tailored solely
to a Wordpress customized PHP interpreter has only 33.4%
of its code remaining and a Nginx-specific library 27.4%.
This suggests that most of the library functions are shared
by PHP and Nginx. Only 2.958 unique ROP gadgets were
found (41.2% of the original amount). Even when comparing
to a library specific to a complete PHP interpreter, this shared
musl-libc setup results in a smaller library with less code.
In summary, this real-world setting shows a significant code
reduction even with a library tailored to multiple applications.
Since this code reduction restricts the options for an attacker
performing an attack (e. g., whole function reuse, ROP, or
PHP code execution), it is an important additional piece for a
security-in-depth environment already providing other forms
of defenses (e. g., CFI).
D. Security Evaluation
OpenConf 5.30 had multiple vulnerabilities that could be
chained together to gain remote code execution [18]. This
was achieved by injecting PHP code into an uploaded file
and executing it. In an application-specific script interpreter
for OpenConf, the attacker’s possibilities are limited after
gaining PHP code execution. The only remaining way to
execute shell commands is by using the mail function which
allows control over the arguments passed to the underlying
sendmail command. However, before the arguments are passed
to sendmail by the PHP interpreter, they are escaped internally.
As a result, it is exploited by creating a file that can be
abused as PHP shell and thus gain PHP code execution [20].
However, again the only remaining way for the attacker to
execute shell commands with her created PHP shell is with
the mail function. Hence, it is not possible for the attacker to
execute any shell commands with the tailored PHP interpreter.
The only exception is a system that uses the Exim mail server
which allows a direct shell command execution with the mail
function. Therefore, depending on the system configuration, an
application-specific script interpreter would mitigate such an
attack.
CVE-2016-5771 and CVE-2016-5773 in the PHP inter-
preter were found for Pornhub’s bug bounty program in
2016 [21]. The penetration testers used it to exploit the
unserialize function and gain remote code execution on
the server. In their ROP shellcode, they used the function
zend_eval_string to interpret a given string as PHP
code. Although an application-specific PHP interpreter would
not have eliminated this vulnerability (since the code was
used by the web application), the exploiting could be made
more difficult with it. For example, the native code function
zend_eval_string is not present in any of our tailored
interpreter instances (except the complete PHP interpreter).
Additionally, when interpreting a string as PHP code, it might
use a removed functionality and thus trigger a booby trap.
Hence, depending on the used web application, the range of
suitable candidates to use for an exploit can be limited.
E. Performance
Since our approach only removes unnecessary code from
the support layer of the target application, it does not induce a
performance penalty. However, it does not have a performance
gain either, because only code is removed that is not executed
by the application anyways. The memory consumption of an
application-specific library is smaller than the consumption of
the complete library, since code is removed from the binary
and therefore not loaded into memory. Nonetheless, since
each group of applications need their own tailored library,
the overall memory consumption of the system is increased.
However, since using containers for each service (which also
increase the memory consumption for each used library)
gains more popularity, we deem it acceptable for practical
deployments.
VII. DISCUSSION
Scripting languages often offer the possibility to dynami-
cally evaluate code (such as eval in PHP). When used by the
application, it makes the initial analysis to gather all necessary
interpreter functionalities much harder. Our approach relies on
the accuracy of specialized analysis tools for this. However,
if the analysis tool is not able to provide accurate data, the
tailored interpreter could break the application. Furthermore,
if a user-provided input is directly passed to an evaluation
function, stripping down the interpreter becomes impossible
since the user can provide any programming construct she
likes. However, such flawed code constructs allow direct
access to the system anyway and trying to prevent it can be
regarded as a losing battle.
As evident from our evaluation, an application-specific
interpreter reduces the options an attacker has if she is
able to execute own code in a targeted web application.
Furthermore, it is able to remove certain vulnerability classes
completely. However, if a web application uses a certain
interpreter functionality that can also be used for an attack,
our approach is not able to thwart this. To be more precise, if
a web application relies on the PHP function exec to execute
commands directly on the system (like in the case of FluxBB),
our approach cannot remove it. To mitigate attacks using this
functionality, approaches to monitor such remaining functions
can be deployed additionally [36].
We showed that the concept of our approach is capable of
working with script interpreters such as PHP and Ruby. How-
ever, as script interpreters have different internal structures, our
approach cannot be used directly with another interpreter such
as Python. To support it, domain knowledge of the interpreter’s
internal workings has to be integrated (i. e., the mapping of
script functions to native code functions). As this merely
means that additional engineering effort is needed to support
other interpreters, it does not constitute a limitation of the
general concept of our approach.
Another limitation is that each application needs its own
customized libraries. As a result, when running multiple
services like a web application in combination with a database
server, both need their own tailored libc (or combine their
analysis results to create one libc for both applications). On
first glance, this seems infeasible for a real-world scenario.
However, the recent trend to separate each part of a service
into a container, such as Docker [1] (which uses Alpine Linux
with musl-libc for official containers), makes our approach
applicable for real-world scenarios. When running a web
application, one container can contain the web server as well
as a script interpreter (e. g., PHP) with a shared application-
specific software stack and another container the database
server with its own tailored software stack. Thus, enhancing
the security mechanism of separating services with reduced
options for an attacker to reuse existing code.
As the evaluation in Section VI has shown, minor manual
configuration is still necessary in some cases. For web appli-
cations these were cases where the used static analysis tool
Parse was not able to process object-oriented programming
constructs. However, this is not a shortcoming of our approach,
but just a limitation of the used analysis tool. Using a different
analysis tool that is capable of handling object-oriented pro-
gramming like RIPS [7] solves this problem. Minor manual
configuration was also necessary for both tested libc versions.
These were either cases that LLVM could not handle due to
assembly, functions that are called by the loader, or functions
that were resolved dynamically during runtime by the loader
as explained in Section V-A. These cases require more engi-
neering work and do not constitute conceptual limitations of
our approach. Assembly directly used in the source code can
either be lifted to LLVM IR with tools such as McSema [37]
or processed separately. Entry point functions called directly
by the loader can be whitelisted initially by just adding the
names of the C specific starting functions (e. g., _start).
We did not do this to have a complete evaluation. Dynamically
resolved functions can be addressed by integrating a data-flow
analysis which ends in the corresponding library functions
(e. g., dlsym). However, solving this in general is hard
since the only case we encountered used a self-implemented
function of the dlsym functionality to resolve the function
pointer. Hence, our approach can be seen as a first step to an
automated way to create application-specific software stacks.
An additional use case for our approach are restricted
script interpreter environments that execute user provided
untrusted scripts such as Google App Engine [4]. These script
interpreters prevent internally the usage of specific sensitive
functions from being executed. However, Park et al. [28]
presented an attack with a restricted attacker model that is
able to rewrite bytecode of functions to execute these sensitive
functions and therefore bypassing the restriction. By applying
our approach for an application-specific script interpreter,
these restricted functionalities are completely removed from
the interpreter and hence such an attack cannot use them.
Our current prototype focuses on removing unused code
from shared libraries and script interpreters written in C,
however, support for C++ is subject of future work. To work
with C++, our approach has to be able to handle virtual
function tables (vtables) which are used on a low-level to
implement polymorphism. A naive approach would be to
whitelist all functions that are part of a vtable. However,
this would decrease the precision of the code debloating and
heavily overestimates the used functions. A better way would
be to improve the static analysis to only keep functions in
the vtable that are actually used. For this to work correctly,
our approach has to track the data flow of vtables precisely to
identify all used functions and must be able to modify entries
in the vtables to remove unused ones [29].
Our approach uses a flow-insensitive analysis to find func-
tion pointer targets with which we did not encounter any
misses during our evaluation. However, the C programming
language allows constructs that do not provide sufficient
meaningful information in LLVM to determine the possible
targets. In these edge cases, a more sophisticated points-to
analysis has to be implemented like the one developed by
Emami et al. [19].
VIII. RELATED WORK
Debloating software is an appealing approach to thwart
attacks and we now discuss works closely related to ours.
Based on the observation that an application only uses a small
part of the code provided by a shared library, Quach et al. [31]
presented a debloating approach. They developed a compiler
extension that adds metadata to an ELF binary (application
and shared libraries) about the location of functions and their
dependencies. On execution of an application, the loader writes
the shared library into memory and then removes all functions
that are not used by the application by overwriting them.
However, though the analysis is similar to the presented one,
their approach is only applicable to native code applications
and does not work with applications written for a script
interpreter.
JRed [23] is an automated approach to remove unused
code from Java applications. It analyzes the bytecode of an
application and removes unused code in the application itself
and core libraries of the JRE. However, it is only capable
of handling Java bytecode and ignores native code libraries
during its analysis. Since JRed only targets Java bytecode, it
does not tackle challenges like indirect control-flow transfers
through function pointers as done by our approach. Landsbor-
ough et al. [26] presented an approach to remove unwanted
functionalities from binary code by using a genetic algorithm.
Since it works on traces obtained via dynamic analysis, it
needs test cases that execute every functionality the target
application should keep. If the set of test cases is not complete,
the code corresponding to a needed but not tested functionality
is removed and thus breaks the application. Additionally, it
does not scale and did not even terminate when removing
a feature from the echo application of coreutils. Chisel [22]
aims to support programmers to debloat programs. It needs
the source code and a high-level specification of its func-
tionalities to remove unwanted features with the help of delta
debugging. A similar goal is pursued by Sharif et al. [35] and
their prototype implementation TRIMMER, a LLVM compiler
extension. With the help of a user-provided manifest about the
desired features, it tries to remove unwanted functionalities
to debloat the application. A binary-only approach targeting
specifically applications using a client-server architecture is
presented by Chen et al. [14]. Their approach uses binary-
rewriting techniques and a user-provided list of features with
corresponding test cases to execute those to customize the
target application. BinRec [24] also aims at debloating already
compiled applications. It is based on LLVM and needs to lift
the target binary into the LLVM IR before it can perform its
transformations. Since automatically removing features from
an application on the binary level is prone to errors, BinRec
also provides a fallback mechanism to use removed code from
the original binary. In contrast to our approach, these ap-
proaches focus on removing features from a target application
itself, while we aim to remove unused functionalities from
libraries and script interpreters.
An approach to debloat the Linux kernel was presented
by Kurmus et al. [25]. Their approach focuses on optimizing
the configuration for the Linux kernel to remove unnecessary
features at compile time. This work is orthogonal to ours and
can further improve the security of the system by not only
tailoring the userspace software stack in an application-specific
way, but also optimizing the Linux kernel to target a specific
application.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an approach to compile shared
libraries tailored to a specific application by removing unused
code from them. Since complex applications, such as the PHP
interpreter, do not even use half of the provided functions in
a shared library, we showed that this debloating significantly
reduces the choices an attacker has for code-reuse attacks.
Furthermore, we demonstrated that with the help of domain
knowledge, our approach is also capable of tailoring a script
interpreter to a script application (e. g., a web application).
We demonstrated an application-specific software stack tai-
lored to a Wordpress installation (customized PHP interpreter,
libc tailored to web server and interpreter), and showed a
significant code reduction.
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APPENDIX
A. Algorithm
The complete algorithm of our approach that is capable of
handling shared libraries, PHP and Ruby interpreter is given
in Algorithm 1. A prototype implementation of this algorithm
is available at https://github.com/RUB-SysSec/ASSS.
Algorithm 1 Complete algorithm to whitelist all needed functions during compilation which is capable of handling shared
libraries, the PHP interpreter and the Ruby interpreter.
global set whitelist
global set php whitelist
global set ruby whitelist
function VISIT MODULE(module)
// Start Global Exploration
for all global in module.globals do
EXPLORE GLOBAL(global)
end for
// Start Function Exploration
for all func in module.funcs do
if func in whitelist then
EXPLORE FUNCTION(func)
end if
end for
end function
// Global Exploration
function EXPLORE GLOBAL(global)
if is php and global is php function table then
for all (func name, func ptr) in global do
if func name not in php whitelist then
global.delete(func name, func ptr)
else
whitelist.insert(func ptr)
end if
end for
else if global is struct then
for all member in global do
EXPLORE GLOBAL(member)
end for
else if global is function pointer then
whitelist.insert(global)
end if
end function
// Function Exploration
function EXPLORE FUNCTION(func)
whitelist.insert(func)
set targets
for all instr in func do
if instr.type == call then
targets.insert(instr.target)
if is ruby then
if instr.target is ruby register function then
(func name, func ptr) = instr.args
if func name in ruby whitelist then
targets.insert(func ptr)
else
delete instruction instr
end if
end if
end if
else if instr.type == store then
targets.insert(instr.store value)
else if instr.type == return then
targets.insert(instr.return value)
else if instr.type == select then
targets.insert(instr.true value)
targets.insert(instr.false value)
else if instr.type == phi then
for all value in instr.incoming values do
target.insert(value)
end for
end if
end for
for all target in targets do
if target is function then
if target not in whitelist then
EXPLORE FUNCTION(target)
end if
end if
end for
end function
